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I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
1. This report is based upon the following: IME’s own research into different aspects of Balkan economies,
especially those in transition, conducted over the last four years; study of recent literature on these
economies and relevant background political and economic developments; a survey of available concepts of
postwar political order in South-eastern Europe; and interviews with economists from all Balkan countries.
Questionnaires were especially designed for the purposes of this report. The methodology is described
below, and a sample questionnaire is attached.
2. The immediate objective is to outline economic development scenarios for the Balkans for the period
from 1999 to 2010. The task covers a span of eleven years, the starting point of which is still evolving; ways
out of the crisis are difficult to foresee, and there is no possibility to quantify and weight political factors on
which future developments will depend. Naturally, there is virtually no comprehensive data on how the war
in Yugoslavia1 is affecting its neighbor countries, so there is no basis for economic simulation and
extrapolation. It is not a forecast but rather a future study, an undertaking which in today’s circumstances is
rather like science fiction. Respectively, the approach will be institutional or even constitutional, rather than
quantitative. We believe these scenarios must have a more profound mission, namely:
• to initiate long-term thinking on the future of the Balkans, to reinforce attempts at such thinking
currently taking place, and to sustain a debate on different development paths;
• to assess the probability of different scenarios, and describe factors that support one development or
another;
• to provoke indigenous ideas on how to overcome past and current divisions and disparities; and
• to advocate approaches and policies that would prevent worst-case developments, help avoid the
previous shortcomings of actions already taken, and support longer-term security and prosperity
scenarios.
 
 3. Six weeks after the NATO air-strikes on Yugoslavia started, Balkan governments claim great losses and
deep impact on the political stability of Albania and Macedonia, but most of this should be taken with a
grain of salt. International institutions – notably the IMF and the World Bank, DG II of the European
Commission, the EBRD, the UN Economic Commission for Europe - judging from press reports, had
promptly fixed their respective mechanisms for immediate remedies, and decided upon their own
approaches to the Balkans. The Paris Club of official lenders is likely to reschedule Albania’s and
Macedonia’s debt payments. There is intensive work being done by national governments, the media, public
policy institutes and opinion leaders to assess current developments and propose solutions for postwar
development. Profound deliberation is underway. It is likely that this time the international response to the
conflict will not be victim to so many delays and inconsistencies as was the case in 1992-1995. The
impression, however, is that lessons from the previous Balkan wars have not been learned, at least not to the
desired extent, either by national or international agencies and opinion leaders. A key weakness of the
postwar conceptions currently being debated is the lack of ideas for the integration of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (or what would left of today’s federation). In working on scenarios, IME tried its best to take
into account ideas and assessment suggested by others.
 
 
 II. METHODOLOGY
 
                                           
1 This report uses the phrase “the war in Yugoslavia” (or “the war”) to indicate what international institutions refer to as “the Kosovo
crisis.”
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 4. In 1990-1995 the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe were essentially economies of
disequilibrium and uncertainty. Delays in political and economic reforms and the uneven progress of such
reforms in many countries (notably Albania, Bulgaria, FR Yugoslavia, Romania and perhaps Croatia), as
well as the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, prolonged this painful period. In assessing long-term prospects
for such economies, one should put more weight on political risk factors. In other words, from among the
sets of typical country risk factors, those related to government policies and the external (geopolitical)
environment are expected to play a decisive role and therefore deserve prime attention.
 The war in Yugoslavia has shifted the accent from domestic onto international political risk factors. We
assume that these factors fall into five categories, of which those related to international risk must be given
priority:
 a) international risk indicators: probabilities of war, external shocks, blocked trade routes, market
protectionism, etc.
 b) domestic political risk indicators: continuousness of reform and government commitment to reform,
stability of the economic environment, entry and exit barriers, transaction costs, property rights and contract
enforcement, etc.;
 c) internal indicators: structure of investment, GDP per capita, inflation, etc.;
 d) external indicators: current account as percent of GDP, import/export fluctuations; structure of exports,
terms of trade, etc.;
 e) debt indicators: debt/GDP ratio, debt service ratios, debt structure, secondary (country’s) sovereign debt
market, etc.
 
 Good policies
 
 5. The new situation also means that in the postwar order the “international governments” would have a
decisive role to play. As the war in Bosnia demonstrated,2 international institutions may have policies with
long-term negative impacts. An assessment of long-term economic development scenarios for the Balkans
must be based on a definition of what is “good” and what is “bad” and international government policy.
 More concretely, a long-run successful economic transition policy should, at a minimum, include
establishment of the following:
• a stable and convertible currency and stable financial and capital market institutions;
• rule of law, irrevocable private property rights and an entrepreneur-friendly environment;
• easy access to capital, and, broadly speaking, to factors of production, for foreign and domestic investors;
• broad-range and transparent privatization;
• a set of contract-enforcing institutions and equal access to justice – uncorrupted police, magistrates,
courts and central and local government administration;
• a set of competitive and transparent conditions for the private provision of formerly public services in the
fields of social safety nets, education, health care and infrastructure.
 In many countries affected by the Yugoslav war, reforms have reached a turning point. In some of them (see
below a detailed discussion of new divisions between economies in South-eastern Europe), reforms should
be reassured or start anew, as an essential part of (and simultaneously to) the rebuilding of the entire region.
 In assessing long-term scenarios for the Balkans, a “good economic policy” conducted by both national and
international institutions means a region-wide approach which:
• rebuilds the war-torn countries and sets long-term prerequisites for growth and prosperity;
• minimizes the possibility of war, external shocks, blocked trade routes, or market protectionism; and
• promotes security via international and regional protection of human rights and dignity, cooperation,
mutual dependence, cross-border clusters, and penetration and interweaving of economic structures.
We assume that there is a common denominator to these policies, a general criterion that is based on one key
concept; namely, the interweaving (die Verflechtung) of economic and societal structures, based on rules
and formal agreements to promote it.3
                                           
 2 See a more detailed overview of these policies in: Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans,
Foreword by Leo Tindemans, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Aspen Institute, 1996), especially on the role of
IFIs (p. 26), and that of the UN, EU, and NATO (pp.: 4-9, 39-68), and the enumeration of the errors of Western policies (pp. 68-75).
3 A counter-argument against the use of this criterion may cite the former-Yugoslav experience of dissolution in 1991-1992 (i.e., the
period between the proclamation of Slovenian and Croatian independence on June 25, 1991, and the proclamation of independent
Bosnia and Herzegovina on March 3, 1992) and the ensuing wars and violent splits of previously seemingly cemented structures of
societal and economic coexistence. However, the key reason for the loss of viability of these structures was the failure of the leader
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The questionnaires we use below to assess different scenarios rearrange recent statistics and require
judgment to attempt to reflect interdependencies.
New divisions
6. We do not deal with the humanitarian crisis in the Balkan countries and the economic shocks of the war
in Yugoslavia. We attempt a consideration of the long-term effects of current developments. We believe that
March 24, 1999, is a date marking a turning point in history. The Balkans and the countries around them
will hardly be the same as in the last ten years. The post-World War II international order, especially law-
enforcement mechanisms, will be readjusted to new precedents and regional and global realities. The
European Union, after failing to assimilate what used to be called South-eastern Europe,4 is likely to develop
some sort of Europe II legal status for the most damaged countries (such as Albania, Macedonia and perhaps
Montenegro and Kosovo). International Financial Institutions (IFIs) will soon have a coordinating role and
later a facility – say, a “Balkan Recovery Program” -- similar to the roles IMF and the World Bank played
during the Persian Gulf War and the UN embargo on FR Yugoslavia (not similar to the European Recovery
Program of 1948).
7. We foresee that the war will enforce new economic divisions on the Balkan peninsula. It is likely that
geographic location, proximity and availability of traditional (pre-1999) trade routes and markets will have a
predominant importance in the short and medium term. Companies from and economies in the Balkan
countries will naturally seek diversity and alternatives to their pre-war links and routes. The governments’
philosophy here is that nations (not companies) compete; seeking rents from others is a norm. Given the
underdevelopment of the region’s capital markets and poor competitiveness, the war puts a physical
constraint on both intra- and extra-regional trade links. Influxes of refugees, lowered custom and transit
revenues and other immediate impacts of the war will cause budget, current- and capital account deficits in
the most affected countries. It is realistic to expect balance of payments gaps in 1999, 2000 and 2001. The
competitive position of their companies will further deteriorate and their economies will be delayed in
meeting EU single market challenges, and most would probably fail to contribute to rebuilding the war-torn
Balkans. Weathering these impacts depends on administrative capacities and reform support from the IFIs.
More concretely, we believe following new divisions are relevant:
1. In the group of countries suffering the most, which would require a restoration period that goes beyond
the 2010 horizon, we identify: FR Yugoslavia (including Kosovo and Montenegro, either within or out
of the federation), Albania and Macedonia; these are most “endangered economies” -- whatever the
constitutional form of postwar Yugoslavia, its role remains crucial.
2. In the group of neighboring countries with fair prospects of swift (2000-2001) compensation and
recovery of war impact, we find Croatia and Romania, and perhaps also Hungary; these are “troubled
economies.”
3. And in the group of countries that could fall into either category (especially if by 2001, a proper postwar
order is not established and initiatives for rebuilding the Balkans are not adequately undertaken and
implemented), we can put Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are “troubled but not yet
endangered” economies.
The troubled economies of Croatia and Romania, besides neighboring the conflict in Yugoslavia, also fall
into another group of countries: along with Slovenia, Greece and Turkey they comprise something like a
“Balkan Fence.” Companies and economies surrounding the war in Yugoslavia are expected to play a key
role during the conflict and in the postwar period. They are in a position to either impose additional burdens
on exchange with external markets, or to facilitate it.
8. In all of the above-mentioned countries, domestic policies have been a key factor in delayed reforms. The
war simply doubled country risks, aggravated the illness of pre-war lack of institution-building, rule of law
and competitiveness. But with the exception of the leaders in Belgrade, governments could not do anything
to prevent the current crisis. Temporary reform failures were common in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.
Albania’s domestic policies today are of considerably less importance than those of Bulgaria or Romania,
                                                                                                                                                
of the former-Yugoslav republics to agree on looser confederation, and especially the refusal of the federal government in Belgrade
to adopt such rules.
4 The name “Balkans” has been perceived as politically incorrect; in this report it means the same as “South-eastern Europe.”
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for the success or failure of current reform plans. The less affected an economy is by the immediate impact
of the war, the greater the role of domestic economic policies. In the postwar period the most endangered
economies of the first group are likely rather to depend on external political and financial support.
Economies of the second and third groups are geared toward domestic policy factors, and for them external
support is rather a supplementary leverage. Respectively, in international affairs, the responsibility of the
political leaders of the latter group for economic and political developments in the Balkans is a new factor to
contend with.
If, in the long run, postwar political and economic orders fail to compensate for currently emerging
divisions, there will be a foundation for further disparities and conflicts.
In the endangered economies, including those of FR Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Kosovo), reforms must
start anew. In the troubled ones, for different reasons (election of reformist government, better prospects for
EU accession, etc.), reforms have recently gained momentum. The immediate need of these countries would
be for secured access to external financing to overcome adverse macroeconomic impacts when and if they
occur, on the precondition that they occur for reasons and factors beyond their control. Rebuilding the
region and prompt international agreements that secure mobility of capital, labor, goods and services is of
vital importance to all countries and must serve as an economic conditio sine qua non for long-term peace.
Legacy risk
9. All Balkan countries are exposed to a sort of legacy risk, when postwar realities reproduce the heritage of
the 1990s or when postwar initiatives, opportunities, policies and instruments are rejected by local or
Western democracies, and fail to behave in an economically rational manner. An example might be failure
to meet the criteria for “good” policies outlined above, but rather institution of policy benefiting a particular
group at the expense of others. It is difficult to quantify these risks, as there are a wide variety of
development options. In general, such risks are highly probable.
The war in Yugoslavia has had an unintended impact on future policy choices: it has made it necessary for
them to be clearer, of an “either-or” type. The countries of the Balkans and the other international players
will either maintain legacies or embark on the path of development, integration and cooperation. Below we
consider two major scenarios based on this clarity, while a third scenario is based on the reaction-pattern of
the EU to the emerging democracies and market economies over the last ten years. In addition, we discuss
approaches that may prevent or support the worst-case scenario.
II. ECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR THE BALKANS IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS
A. Monumental economic disasters
10. The first scenario is a repeat of the fundamental features of Balkan history over the last ten years. FR
Yugoslavia remains a part of the Balkan problem. If this happens, it will be a scenario of monumental
economic disasters for both most of the individual countries in the region and in the Balkans as such.
Monumental disasters are extraordinary institutional constraints to economic freedom, growth and
prosperity. We borrow this term from Thrainn Eggertsson,5 who uses it to describe why Iceland failed to
develop a fishing industry for about a thousand years. In the case of Iceland there were external powers and
shocks that between the 9th and 19th centuries restricted Icelanders from fishing in the open sea. We believe,
however, there are also domestic (and in the case of Balkans, intra-regional) factors that may impose
institutional barriers to growth and hamper the prospects for prosperity in the long run.
External factors of possible support for this scenario are as follows:
• war legacies and divisions established by them;
• failure of international players (namely: the UN, NATO, IFIs, EU, G8 and the United States) to agree on
rules and cost-sharing patterns for rebuilding Balkans, or agreement on an inappropriate plan; and
• commitment on the part of the above-mentioned Balkan Fence countries to seek rents from war-
established divisions within South-eastern Europe.
                                           
5 See: Thrainn Eggertsson, “No Experiments, Monumental Disasters: Why It Took a Thousand Years to Develop a Specialized
Fishing Industry in Iceland,” (Workshop on Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 1994).
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 Domestic (and in the case of Balkans, intra-regional) factors of possible support for this scenario are as
follows:
• consistent failure of Balkan countries and leaders to agree on long-lasting peace agreements and
constitutional order;
• discrepancies in economic development within the region6 and different paces of market and democratic
reforms; and
• aspirations to build nation-states at the expense of others, lack of respect for human and minority rights.
 
 Main features
 
 11. The probability of a longer war or coexistence on the brink of war seems significant. It well may be that
there is a war that continues with interruptions over a period of 6 months to 2-4 years, and that despite the
efforts of international communities there will be another war on the eve of 2010. The inter-war periods
could be periods of delayed wars, when the parties prepare for the next step of a “desired” solution with
milder or harsher practices of ethnic cleansing, and renewed claims on others’ territories, symbols and
heritage from once-common, or at least not divided, historic endeavors.
 The background driving force of a long-lasting war must be found in the formation of nation-states in the
region, a process which in other parts of Europe occurred between the 17th and 19th centuries, and in intra-
regional economic disparities.
• Albanians in Kosovo are undergoing such nation-state formation.
• Led by Milosevic and backed by the Serbian identity, FR Yugoslavia is “defending” its national pride
and territory.
• Macedonia, with its recently-gained independence, faces the challenge of defending its status quo.
• Montenegro is likely to embark on the nation-state path in the nearest future.
• Many constitutions in the region prevent flexibility on ethnic issues in their concept of statehood,
envisage a constituent nation,7 ban autonomy,8 restrict foreigners from owning land,9 or prohibit political
representation of ethnic and religious minorities.10
• In the 20th century most countries have used some form of “soft” ethnic cleansing; e.g., the last pre-
Yugoslavian case was the expulsion of Bulgarian ethnic Turks in May-June 1989 to neighboring Turkey
(after they were deprived of their property rights).
 
 12. Even if we assume that there is no pan-Balkan tendency for ethnically clean nation-states and take for
granted that such states are virtually impossible, the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (and the drafting
of the newly independent states’ respective constitutions) and the current war over Kosovo set a precedent
with long-lasting consequences.11 A country’s national and ethnic self-determination is theoretically and
ethically accepted to be a just aspiration. Civil society structures that may counteract chauvinist minds and
movements are rare, weak and disliked by political leaders. It seems that there is some underlying mental
mood that was summarized by the economist Vlado Gligorov, who is familiar with the region: “Why I
should be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in mine?” There is no currently-employed
legal instrument that can ensure that an ethnic group or nation, seeking liberation from another group or
                                           
6 See: Krassen Stanchev, “Market Reforms in the Balkans: Barriers and Challenges,” Balkan Transitions, edited by Ivailo Dichev,
(Sofia, ACCESS, 1997).
7 E.g., the Croatian Constitution says: “Croatia, the nation-state of the Croatian people and the state of other nationalities and
minorities which are its citizens”; the Macedonian Constitution contains quite a similar statement: “Macedonia, the national state of
the Macedonian people, which guarantees the complete civic equality and permanent cohabitation of the Macedonian people with the
Albanians, Turks, Roma, and other nationalities living there.” The Bulgarian Constitution states that “the official language … is
Bulgarian” (Article 3), with no legal definition of what “an official language” is.
8 E.g., Article 2.1 of the Bulgarian Constitution.
9 E.g., Article 22.1 of the Bulgarian Constitution, Article 41.2 of the Romanian Constitution. In both cases, legal tricks help to get
around the ban; but the point is that constitutional thinking is counter-productive in terms of international economic cooperation.
There are similar provisions in other Balkan constitutions.
10 E.g., in the Constitution of Bulgaria one may find the statement that “the traditional religion [in the country] is the Orthodox
Christian congregation” (Article 13.2), and that political parties established on “ethnic, racial or religious lines” are not allowed
(Article 11.4), while such parties exist de facto and it is almost impossible to implement this provision de jure.
 11For further details see: Krassen Stanchev, “The Balkan Map in 2010: A Futuristic Attempt,” Sotziologicheski Problemi, No 4, 1995
(in Bulgarian); Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, pp. 28-36.
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nation, will not eventually turn into an oppressor of a third group or nation.12 If this mood prevails, by the
year 2010 we will need to deal with conflicts over the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.
 
 13. Except for Albania (in 1997, 3.8% of its imports were from Bulgaria) and Macedonia (in 1998, 20% of
exports and 12% of imports were to and from FR Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria is a partner), the core Balkan
countries have little exchange with neighboring transition economies but large trade with surrounding
economies. Countries at the center and to the south of the peninsula have several times greater trade with
Greece and Turkey. Aside from that direction, most countries’ major trading partners are to the northwest;
over 60% of the region’s exports and imports are to and from EU, CEFTA and EFTA countries. A longer
war or threat of war and interruption of those trade routes will put all these volumes at risk. If this scenario
dominates in Balkan economies over the long term, the countries will run huge trade deficits. A monumental
disaster would mean failure to develop those few competitive advantages the countries’ respective private
sectors succeeded in identifying, in tourism, wines, delicacy canning, knitwear, and some high-tech and
service industries.
 
 14. Economies and company structures are not well positioned to prevent external constraints to regional
and indigenous development.
• Although most economies are led by private sectors and services (the average share of the private sector
in GDP is about 60%), they are rarely competitive.
• Foreign direct investment is negligible in absolute and in per-capita terms. Countries have small
economic “lobbies,” due to limited foreign ownership.
• The level of foreign ownership in the Spanish economy is 42%, in Poland 12%, and in Romania 6%.13
• Mutual activities of economic agents (besides Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina) is no factor for integration
and cooperation.
• Mutual penetration of neighboring bank sectors is close to zero, with the exception of some Turkish and
Greek banks. Foreign ownership in banking sectors is a rare phenomenon in the Balkan transition
economies.
• While Bulgaria and Romania (and to some extent Croatia) are exceptions, the foreign share is 2.5 times
smaller than in Hungarian banking sector.
 A common practice when transferring payments to a company in a neighboring country is for companies to
use the services of international correspondent banks.
• Domestic, not to mention regional (or of regional significance) commodity exchanges, do not exist or
function badly. Links between capital markets are at the level of irregular correspondence between the
heads of the stock exchanges.
 We do not have precise data on cross-border clusters in the Balkans. When we tried to identify examples of
Bulgarian-Macedonian cooperation, the Chamber of Commerce in Sofia found 23 companies with mixed
ownership, but all except one were in the trade sector. The debate about a second bridge between Romania
and Bulgaria is an old story. The project has been around since 1886. In fact, capital and trade flows go
about equally north and south of Danube; over the last 10 years trade has never gone above two percent on
either side. Delays on ferries, bridges and border-crossings occur in 80% of cases, for both logistical and
procedural reasons.
 
 15. The war in FR Yugoslavia has exacerbated these hurdles. Any postwar settlement that fails to eliminate
them would mean:
• the “endangered economies” of Albania, Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro would
further deteriorate or remain at high risk;
• the economies of Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina would fall into the same category as those
“endangered species”; and
• the “troubled economies” of Croatia and Romania would remain at risk in the medium term, but perhaps
fail to benefit from larger markets to the southeast.
 
 B. Balkan Valleys
                                           
 12See discussion of this phenomenon in relation to Balkans in: Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the
Balkans, pp.: 28-32.
13 Source: Heriot-Watt University, UK, quoted by: Francis Harris, “Join at your Peril,” Business Central Europe, March, 1999, 12.
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 16. This scenario would be the aftermath of the best practices, which besides the errors and failures have
been taking place in the economies of the region. This scenario has more to do with a vision than with
indigenous legacies. It should allow for incremental development, a piecemeal approach to cooperation and
investment, and a secured (perhaps internationally underwritten) economic and peace order. Balkan wars hit
each of the region’s economies in a different manner. Within the next ten years, we will have more Balkan
countries. Each of them, no matter how small, should follow certain policies of entering the marketplace
and/or adjusting to external shocks. Eventually, incremental development and a piecemeal approach would
bring about individual routes to integration and prosperity.
 
 Coveted features
 
 17. This is a “neighbor-success” scenario. FR Yugoslavia, and accordingly Kosovo and Montenegro, could
be a provisionally indispensable part of the solution to the problems. The peculiarity here is that this could
not take place in a neighborhood of countries and economies isolated by war and buried in old conflicts. In
the abstract terms of science fiction, it would require:
• low tariff barriers;
• a competitive market environment;
• free exchange of goods, services, capital and ideas;
• market potential of about 58 million (not including Turkey);
• a well-functioning infrastructure;
• easy accessibility to all the sights and corners of the Balkan peninsula; and
• stable and transparent exchange rate mechanisms (preferably, currency board regimes) and transparent
and stable prices.
18. To achieve this, a joint strategy is needed to strengthen competitiveness, involve Turkey and other
countries of the Balkan Fence group, and promote infrastructure projects on mutually beneficial grounds.
This scenario is not at all rooted in the political and historical backgrounds of the countries in the region,
and for this reason is rather unlikely. However, it is worthwhile to attempt such policies. There is a chance
of success, depending on two factors:
1. support from the international community for peace and institution-building, and
2. rebuilding the region and development of the regional infrastructure.
Such efforts should aim at facilitated access to outside markets and that of outside capital to local markets,
as well as at cross-country cooperation between businesses and specific industry sub-sectors, and need to
progress through the following stages:
• securing of regional and individual countries political stability;
• agreement upon joint strategies to strengthen regional economic order;
• negotiation and removal of  “national” preferences for selected sectors;
• enforcement of open public procurement procedures; and
• facilitation of trade via lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers.
 
 Feasibility
 
 19. It is hardly possible that Western companies will invest in individual countries of the region, especially
in FR Yugoslavia, unless there is substantial political and investment risk coverage or an effort at rebuilding
the region. Combined London and Paris club claims on the former Yugoslavia (prior to 1991) total US $16
billion. Despite the efforts of Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, the debt has yet to be settled -- mostly due
to obstructions from Belgrade’s central bank and government. The successor-states of the former Yugoslavia
also have claims one against another. Similar is the issue of restitution and/or compensation for refugees
deprived of their property rights. All of these problems put a big question mark over the enforcement of
property and creditor rights and increase the risk and costs of investment in FR Yugoslavia, but not only
this. As soon as peace and political stability (i.e., a democratically-elected government committed to peace
and international cooperation) are achieved in FR Yugoslavia, it should be granted appropriate debt
forgiveness in order to ensure its swifter re-entry into the postwar reconstruction of South-eastern  Europe.
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 A postwar settlement of the former Yugoslavia’s debts would diminish prospects for the debt reduction of
other Balkan countries. Only those directly affected (Albania and Macedonia) are likely to negotiate
favorable repayment schedules with the Paris club.
 
 20. Despite all of the barriers to foreign investment, there are investors that already have a stake in the
region. They vary for different countries, but they are likely to stick around and be prepared to use any
business opportunities as soon as they occur. Disrupted trade may be cured by free trade agreements with
EU, following the example of Turkey (believed not to be very positive), or via other policy instruments. At
the end of the day, different parts of the Balkans might be rather different in terms of dominating foreign
investment, payment and customs agreements and competitive advantages.
 
 21. The financial infrastructure in most of the region’s countries is in status nascendi. It is likely that
opening their economies and keeping on track with their market reforms would result in privatization of
their baking sectors and deeper links with international and financial markets. This is a likely development
for the groups of “troubled” and “troubled but not yet endangered” countries, provided they keep up
profound reform efforts.
 
 22. The monetary systems in the region look more diverse than they actually are. Large segments of Balkan
markets use the Deutschemark as a reference currency, in many countries the domestic currency is
substitutable (though not legally), and people save (often outside banks) in D-marks or U.S. dollars. The
currency board arrangements (CBA) in Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina proved to be a major tool for
macroeconomic stability and imposed hard budget constraints in politically uncertain environments. Similar
results have been experienced Lithuania and Estonia, which have even older currency boards. The latter
managed to weather the 1998 Russian crisis with its two economic (institutional) instruments: its CBA and
the flexibility of its economic and business structures. Since early 1999 both Balkan CBAs are pegged to the
Euro. In Bulgaria, it does not seem to have hampered exports.
 
 Merchandise exports and exchange rate after the introduction of the currency board
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 The graph shows that in the period between the currency board’s introduction (effectively March-April
1997) and the beginning of the air-strikes on FR Yugoslavia, there was no direct link between exports and
exchange rate. It is likely that periods of lower exports resulted from institutional and structural reasons,
from the economy’s  lack of flexibility. A provisional postwar situation would be similar in all Balkan
countries.
 Another similarity to some postwar situation is demonstrated by the current economy  in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: foreign aid in the country amounted to 70% of GDP in 1998, a significant improvement. At
least the most-affected Balkan economies would resemble the Bosnia-Herzegovina of 1997 and 1998, and to
some extent the Bulgaria of early 1997 (though there was no war), where the CBA’s created financial
stability in impoverished countries.
 CBA’s limit the government monopoly on money supply. Thus, they lead to price stability and provide the
financial system with transparency, which will be extremely desirable in the postwar Balkans.
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 23. Poor physical infrastructure in roads and railroads, telecommunications, transport and utilities has been a
major economic reality for all Balkan transition economies. The war just made things even worse.14 Three
years ago, The International Commission on the Balkans suggested a solution that is equally important today
and in the postwar period: it recommended “the creation of a Transport and Infrastructure Association for
the entire Balkan space. This would not conflict with EU regulations, and it could be of considerable value
to provide a framework not only for raising funds from the World Bank and the EBRD but also for planning
major rail, road, and telecommunications investments and ensuring the rational development of air
transport.”15
 
 24. Public opinion, voters and government leaders still have to accept the necessities of this scenario. Once
practiced, genocide and ethnic cleansing constitute a legacy for ensuing generations. It is difficult to
eradicate memories of past violence when there is no shared vision of a common future and prosperity. None
of the available concepts of the future of the region  thus far (neither those of political leaders, nor of the
general public, business, and younger generations)16 seem to have been inspired or committed to intra-
regional cooperation and exchange. The governments of EU-associated countries are focused on bilateral
agreements with the EU. They do not usually pay attention to issues of regional cooperation, other than
ordinary trade and other agreements, while this scenario would require greater commitment and
compromise.
 
 Sticks and carrots
 
 25. In 1991 the IMF and the World Bank insisted on the preservation of the economic powers of the federal
Yugoslav government. Currently they undertake an individual approach to the needs of the affected (and
eligible) countries, depending on the current status of their relations with the IMF and the IBRD. They have
announced they are ready to play a coordinating role in international financial efforts to cure Balkan
illnesses. They can also play an important role through policy advice. However, in the circulated
communiquй on the principles for the provision of external financing, there is not a single word about any
“regional” approach. “Regional” means the provision of external financing upon the pre-condition of
implementing rules of the game for regional cooperation, institutional design and transparency. Such policy
could mean politics, so it should made transparent form the very outset.
 
 26. The underlying principle of the international players’ attitude should be an approach related to
individual country circumstances, with provision of funding on the condition of implementing policies that
benefit the region and its links to international markets. A similar “political” approach is desirable on the
part of all institutional payers in the postwar Balkans. “Troubled but not yet endangered economies” could
have a “priority” position in IFI’s cooperation, provided deteriorated performance is really due to external
                                           
 14 War damage in FR Yugoslavia is still yet to be estimated. Before the war, 65 kilometers of gas pipeline on Serbian territory and 40
kilometers on Bulgarian territory were lacking to connect Bulgaria’s natural gas network with that of Yugoslavia; there is no gasoline
pipeline between the two countries; there is a natural gas pipeline with Macedonia, Greece and Turkey, going to Skopje, Athens and
Istanbul, respectively; a natural gas pipeline is lacking to link Bulgaria’s network with the Greek port of Kavala; and gasoline lines
are largely missing. Highways are interrupted on Bulgarian and Yugoslav territory, if we consider the Belgrade-Istanbul (West-East)
route (highway is lacking between Nis and Sofia, and is unfinished between the Northern Thracian city of Plovdiv and Turkey’s
border town of Kapu-Kule); North-South and Black Sea-Adriatic highways do not exist at all, nor parts of the Macedonian road
network. Virtually any kind of infrastructure is lacking on Albanian territory. There is no connection between Romanian and
Bulgarian natural gas pipelines, nor between Macedonian and Yugoslavian ones; a natural gas pipeline goes from Belgrade to Bosnia
but there is no link to Croatia (Croatia is supplied from the Adriatic via Slovenia). Electricity supply networks were established
according to the COMECON “division of labor,” and are attached to Russia and Central Europe, but not as part of intra-Balkan
infrastructure. Meanwhile, in 1992 Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia established an inter-government coalition to
link themselves to the Western European electricity transmission network, which was accomplished two years ago. Balkan countries
have hardly tested the waters for negotiations on electricity transmission reorientation and intra-Balkan links. Besides cable networks
between Bulgaria and all neighboring countries that were established in 1996 and 1997, and similar links in Croatia, Slovenia and to
some extent Romania, communications are slow and inefficient.
 15Unfinished Peace, p.144.
 16In early 1997, the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank conducted the only recent representative survey, coordinated
by Djordjija Petkoski, on how Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania reflect their future, both as nations
and neighbors in the Balkans; a cohesive vision on the region is visually missing in all countries.
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factors. The principles of the EU single market do not contradict policies that would be good for the postwar
Balkans. There is no conflict with the declared policies of the IFIs, either.
 
 C. Balkan basement
 
 27. This scenario is a realization of ideas about Second Europe. Intentions and procedures behind such
efforts could either convert the Balkans into a garden within ten-fifteen years, or push it back onto the path
of monumental disasters. Its major feature is the implementation of the easiest approaches and policies
currently employed by the structures of the EU and the governments of the Balkan countries. It would be
easy for this scenario to evolve because it utilizes approaches that are readily available and responds to
requests that are apparent in the region. It may not be a problem to achieve political consensus on the major
stages of this scenario, in a situation in which prompt solutions are desired. The general metaphor of this
scenario is that it may establish foundations for postwar economic and political order, but if poorly
implemented it may preserve the “under-qualified” status of the economies and countries it is intended to
integrate.
 We live in a situation of boiling imagination about the Balkans. Most ideas need still to be debated and
revised. Often speakers use the same words but mean different postwar realities.
 Early flyers of this scenario are the preliminary draft discussion ideas of a Postwar Stability Treaty
expressed by representatives of the German government and of a System for Postwar South-East Europe (a
shadow green draft paper from the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels), and repeated general
references to provisional Marshall plans for the Balkans made by politicians and the media in the affected
countries and EU-member states.
 The common denominator of these ideas is that they amend current institutional legacies, provide
administrative continuity and do not create fancy realities out of the ashes of the war.
 The Monumental Economic Disasters scenario is a continuation of rather spontaneous (societal) institutions
that were sanctified into formality and tradition by the practices of the last ten years and reinforced by
individual countries’ constitutions.
 The Balkan Basement is a scenario to be initiated by legacies of national and international administrations
and government leaders. It is a case of political and administrative engineering, typical for Realpolitik but
difficult to swallow when ideas materialize.
 The Balkan Valleys scenario is somewhere in between; its background is more complicated, it lacks many of
both the societal and bureaucratic legacies, and it has more political problems to solve.
 
 Europe II
 
 28. The political dimension of this sub-scenario consists in the creation of new relationships between the
European Union and the war-torn Balkan countries. The merits of this approach are:
• it realizes a regional approach that is largely lacking in most of the Balkan initiatives from 1991 to date;
• it immediately establishes an international “government,” responsible for the affairs on the spot, and
solves the problem of the postwar constitution of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and perhaps other states that may
emerge in the region or elsewhere;
• it mobilizes resources to conduct real pre-accession processes in previously “hopeless” accession
countries (e.g., Croatia, Macedonia, Albania) whose governments insisted for years on a softer approach;
it streamlines Brussels’ administration in dealing with the region and saves implementation costs of other
less-articulated blueprints;
• it really may bolster the process of joining the single market of the Union and shorten the distance
between EU accession laggers and front-runners;
• it may speed up the reconstruction of EU structures in order to accommodate countries “hopeful” of
accession; and
• it establishes more-or-less clear incentive-treats mechanisms, with an underlying message that not joining
Europe II would have a high political price.
 
 29. The concrete forms of Europe II legal foundations would be manifold and problematic; they include
different versions of the EU’s existing “four-pillar” policies (the fourth pillar being EU-non-EU bureaucratic
coalitions) and implementation vehicles. One precondition is some sort of peace and stability treaty in the
aftermath of the war in Yugoslavia. Next come different vehicles for getting EU enlargement through
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current procedures. Presumably, immediate autonomous membership would be restricted to Kosovo and
other endangered countries and economies. Parallel to these, there should be a process of NATO
enlargement to ensure security and peace-keeping in the region. Economic agreements are discussed
separately in the next paragraph. Their major role, after immediate relief and reconstruction needs are
covered, would be to make possible in the more distant future the mobility of capital, goods and services,
labor and people. It would challenge the current motivation for Schengen-like rules if freedom of movement
rights were the same for autonomous members as for “actual” EU-citizens, and challenge the feasibility of
the entire plan if the rules “are not quite the same.” Acceptance of a general principle of multi-ethnic and
religious coexistence is believed to be a crucial foundation for any postwar treaty. How to judge whether
this principle is profound, is not clear. The implementation vehicles will be most of the current programs of
the EU. They are expected to support civil society structures in the endangered and neighboring countries.
 
 30. The economic cornerstone is the creation of CBAs or CBA-like regimes, pegging local currencies to the
Euro (or substituting them with the Euro), and signing a multilateral trade agreement with countries granted
the status of semi-members of the EU. As in the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the new aftermath of the
crisis the FR Yugoslavia, and respectively Kosovo and Montenegro, would probably implement rebuilding
and stabilization programs.
 The stability treaty for others will have features already formulated in different forums (EU finance
ministers, the IMF and the World Bank, EBRD Annual Meeting, G-8, UN ECE, etc.):
• political and investment guarantee schemes;
• financing infrastructure;
• support for the balance of payments;
• debt forgiveness; and
• structural reforms and development programs.
These measures are natural, and have already been tested in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other countries. They
seem to constitute no problem and are the same as the economic steps outlined in the previous scenario.
Perhaps the only difference is that in Europe II, the government structures of Brussels take over
administrative and political responsibility.
31. The key problem the Europe II sub-scenario fails to solve is justice.
From the point of view of international law and political attitudes, it would not be fair to give Yugoslavia an
equal start along with the other affected countries. From a philosophical point of view, it may not be
justifiable to punish a nation for the actions of the government it elects, and, as Zarko Puhovski put it, “it is
impossible to punish a government in warfare without punishing the nation.” But this is a war. The argument
could have different formulations: from that of a tacit intention to punish Yugoslavia to that of an honest
reward for those who “have tried hard for a long time.” However, if there is no equal start for FR
Yugoslavia, there is a preferential treatment for those who suffered most, the Albanian people of Kosovo. If
Kosovars get the status of an autonomous entity within the EU and Montenegro secedes, there will be an
incentive for other groups to break away from Serbia. At the end of the decay or even earlier, the EU would
create an ethnically clean Serbia.
In these circumstances, the EU-accession front-runners may feel they are treated unfairly. Advanced
reforms, better economic performance and institutional development and greater competitiveness may turn
out not to be the proper limousine to enter the club. The chart of the poorer would be welcome under
advantageous terms. The principle of “the most affected served first” would be used, instead of the “first
come first served” principle.
In order to avoid such opportunism, the EU would be forced to initiate special association treaties and
partnerships with the newly autonomous states and regions. These treaties would obviously have lower
status than ordinary associated membership. In order to stop regions and countries from rushing in the open
door, from the very outset it would made clear that the new status is of limited applicability to selected
newcomers. To the extent that this happens, the Union would be preserving the existing discrepancies in the
region. Front-runners will remain front-runners, laggers will remain laggers, and autonomous members will
remain autonomous.
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32. Another problem is logistics. In a natural but fairly difficult-to-predict manner, FR Yugoslavia is setting
both the time schedule and the political benchmark for all postwar plans. If it fails to elect a legitimate
government committed to integration, the entire house of postwar Europe will be built on shaky foundations.
A likely development is that Kosovo Albanians will not be in a position to return home by the fall of 1999,
as expected in most EU reports on the refugee situation. The reasons are simple: destruction is at the rates of
Bosnia (i.e. 60%); houses around the country must be reconstructed but domestic resources are limited;
construction materials are expensive imports because roads and railroads have been destroyed at a rate of at
least 30% (according to NATO headquarters reports); and if people do not return fairly soon they will have
no possibility to plant and harvest this year, in which case they would starve during the winter in the open
air of their homeland.
If the Kosovars do not return in the near future (as seems to be the case), all of the plans for special
membership status and peace treaties based on legitimate representation must be postponed. Albania and
Macedonia, who host the refugees, would be in a position only to receive aid, spending enormous energy on
keeping their societies together. If the result is a receivership from the EU and other international
institutions, why should it be called enlargement of the Union.
If the Europe II plans go into effect, the likeliest beneficiaries will be the Balkan Fence countries, rather than
those in the name of whom the plans were conceived. As an observer put it bluntly: “we do not need an iron
curtain, we need an iron fence or a wall to separate us from the Balkans.”
Marshall plans revisited
33. When Western and Eastern European political leaders and opinion-makers talk about a South-eastern
European “Marshall plan,” they mean different Marshall plans. In the East, this a vague notion. It expresses
an expectation of a lump sum of hard currency which government can spend to boost investment and
growth. The message of this attractive name is: “give us the money on soft terms, we know how to spend it.”
In the West, this notion denotes a set of institution-building measures, similar to those described in
paragraphs 16-23 and 30. The two visions still have to become explicit.
34. In the West, Marshall plan proponents recall the realities of post-World War II Europe, which had a
level of destruction much more massive than that in Bosnia and FR Yugoslavia. In the East, proponents of
the Marshall plan began referring to it immediately after the political changes of 1989-1990, during the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the first UN embargo on FR Yugoslavia, after the embargo, before the current
war in FR Yugoslavia, and now they repeat the same schlager again. Before the current war they continually
missed one point: Europe was destroyed by war, and Eastern Europe by central planners. A quid pro quo
effect of the current war is the following attitude: “Yes, we were right, the plan is the only solution.” But
they again miss a crucial point: the destruction in both wars in the former Yugoslavia took place in only one
country, during two wars led in the name of one and the same idea: an ethnically clean nation-state. It was
shameful, it was unjust. But it was and is, so far, of marginal importance to the global economy.
35. Recently, in February-March 1999, the greater-than-expected current account deficit of Hungary had to
be taken into consideration by 350 hedge funds, pension funds and institutional investors related only to
Merrill Lynch, and was a signal for them to re-channel investment from European to other emerging
markets. Such re-direction may be applied to the annual US $45 billion in emerging market investment. In
the context of the debate on a provisional Marshall plan for South-eastern Europe, this so-far isolated case
tells a story of mobility, investment volumes and significance. A South- eastern European “Marshall plan”
could make sense for the economies of the region, but not for the global economy.
36. In order to have a Marshall Plan, Balkan governments should realize what the original story was. By no
means it is a financing facility that grants some amounts to a government to spend during a four-five year
mandate and then get reelected. The original Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program (ERP), had
no direct influence on economic growth. Vigorous growth was already present in 1947 (before the
introduction of the Plan), and industrial output was exceeding the pre-war level; without the Plan Europe’s
economies might have grown at a slower pace but would not have declined.17 The real aftermath of the ERP
was unintended but long-lasting institution building, starting from a prototype organization of today’s
                                           
17 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe: 1945-1951, London, Mathuen & Co., 1984, pp.: 7-13, 113.
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OECD, setting the rules of multilateral trade and the customs union, the advent of the European payment
union, respectively, the Schuman Plan, and reaching the Common Market. The Marshall Plan cannot be
repeated in this form. A similar form would be a coordinated and supported effort to build or join the
institutions (i.e., rules) of the global economy. But this is exactly what the Balkan transition economies (at
least most of them) pretend to be doing. If it is a plan to finance government investments, or a plan to
rebuild the region, it should be called and executed differently.
The governments of the Balkans must not be expected to achieve similar institutions in the immediate
aftermath of the Yugoslav war. The nature of the war is different, and the nature of the world economy is
different. Currently, most of them do not even have the information and statistics to facilitate some sort of
“Balkan Recovery Program” resembling the original ERP. They are not to be expected to have such
institutions even in the medium term; this is a trial-and-error process which takes time. But they can start
working this direction, securing a consensus for their successors to continue.
A rent-seeking attitude is the most harmful one for such efforts. But rent-seeking may be supported by
poorly designed, wrongly perceived and blindly implemented ideas of “Europe II” and a “Marshall Plan” as
a substitute for central planning.
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